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Abstract
The recent proliferation of mobile computing has given rise to vehicular so-
cial networks (VSNs) which use the Internet of Vehicles and social networks as
the main design elements. As one of the most critical components in VSNs,
location sharing plays an important role in helping vehicles share information
and strengthen their social bonds. This, however, may compromise vehicles’
privacy, including location information and social relationship details. Some
solutions have been proposed to address these challenges. However, none of
them considers privacy of inter-user threshold distance, which effectively can
be used to identify vehicles, their friends, and location information, by mali-
cious or undesired elements of the system. In order to overcome this limitation,
we propose a secure distance comparison protocol. Furthermore, we present a
privacy-preserving location-sharing scheme in VSNs, namely PPLS, which al-
lows vehicles to build more complex access control policies. The safety of our
scheme is validated by the security analysis, and experimental results demon-
strate the efficiency of PPLS scheme.
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1. Introduction
With the fast development & deployment of mobile computing, vehicular ad
hoc networks have become important data transmission platforms and greatly
promote the realization of Intelligent Transport System (ITS). Recently, the ap-
plication goal of vehicular ad hoc networks [1] transforms from simply improving
the safety of road traffic and the efficiency of transportation to vehicular social
networks (VSNs), which deeply integrates the Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) [2] and
social networks. Through VSNs, vehicles can experience more comprehensive
services.
VSNs can provide various services [3, 4], including location-based services
(LBSs). In LBSs, geographical locations of vehicles are exploited to provide
information and entertainment services, since the location of a vehicle usually
represents its contextual information [5]. As millions of applications based on
LBSs are available, vehicles can easily obtain information such as restaurants,
hotels, etc. In fact, as a fundamental component of VSNs, LBSs have become
increasingly popular and important.
While enjoying the convenience of location-based services, the privacy threats
should not be ignored [6]. Especially after some research work [7, 8, 9] revealing
horrifying security and privacy issues which have caused serious public concerns.
In LBSs, users are expected to update their real-time location information and
share it for better services. However, disclosing the location information is dan-
gerous, since an adversary can track an individual and infer his/her preferences.
This threat becomes more serious in VSNs as vehicles’ location can be corre-
lated with their profiles [10]. Hence, it is essential to protect vehicles’ location
privacy [11, 12, 13] in VSNs.
To address these problems, a series of research works have been performed.
A MobiShare system was presented by Wei et al. [14], allowing users to share
location information flexibly. Inspired by [14], Shen et al. [15, 16] proposed a
system called N-Mobishare. Li et al. [17] proposed MobiShare+ which reduces
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the security risk of MobiShare. In 2016, Liu et al. [18] provided a system called
BMobishare. Recently, Li et al. [19] proposed a more secure location-sharing
scheme. The aforementioned systems support two kinds of queries, i.e., friends’
queries and strangers’ queries, and also satisfy access control policy. Aside from
all listed above, [20, 21, 22] also provide efficient way for key management which
bring support for cryptographic solutions.
However, these mechanisms are not perfect. Firstly, the threshold distance
is a personal preference of each vehicle (to establish a social circle), but this
is used as public information for location service entities in the system. When
the threshold distance set by a vehicle is a special number, or the threshold
distances set for different targets are in a special data group, the adversary can
track the data or data group to identify vehicles. Secondly, threshold distance
is used by a vehicle to determine with whom they are willing to share locations.
Some schemes use broadcast encryption to share personal location information,
which violates the distance-based access control policy. Finally, it is far from
actual application requirements that all systems mentioned above use a single
threshold distance for all friends. Vehicles may wish to set different threshold
distances for different friends.
Our contributions: Motivated by these issues, we propose a privacy-
preserving location-sharing scheme in VSNs, namely PPLS. The contributions
are described as follows.
(1) In previous research, a vehicle can only set a single threshold distance for all
friends. However, this setting does not meet the actual needs. To improve
the practicability of the system, our scheme allows vehicles to set different
threshold distances for different friends. In our scheme, vehicles can use a
more flexible strategy to achieve access control.
(2) Since existing works do not consider the privacy of the threshold distance,
an adversary can easily collect threshold distances to get more personal
information of vehicles. To overcome this defect, we propose a new secure
distance comparison protocol to execute encrypted distance comparison and
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prevent location servers from determining this sensitive data.
(3) Based on the proposed secure distance comparison protocol, we propose
the PPLS scheme. In PPLS, vehicles are allowed to set different threshold
distances for different friends, and broadcast encryption is not used, while
diverse queries are used for information retrieval.
This paper is organized in the following sections. In Section 2, we provide
the system models and design goals. In Section 3, we present the building
blocks including the proposed secure distance comparison protocol. Section 4
introduces the PPLS scheme and Section 5 gives its security analysis. In Section
6, performance analysis is provided. Finally, we draw a conclusion in Section 7.
2. System Models and Design Goals
This section presents the formal system architecture, system work flows, and
the threat model for location privacy. We also identify and list the security goals
for the proposed scheme.
2.1. System Architecture
The system architecture is depicted in Figure 1 where four main entities
interact with each other.
Vehicles. The vehicles of VSNs, can communicate with roadside units (RSUs)
directly. They can get their own locations from GPS and request for locations
of specific friends, nearby friends and strangers.
RSUs. After RSUs receive requests from vehicles, they forward them towards
the social network server, then return the received responses to vehicles.
Social network server (SNS). SNS is responsible for managing vehicles’ social
relationships, such as profiles and friend lists. SNS can communicate with RSUs
and location servers directly.
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Location servers (LSs). These servers primarily manage vehicles’ location infor-
mation. They calculate location distances and related tasks of finding vehicles
within a certain area, which are assigned by SNS. LSs communicate with SNS
directly, but different LSs are not allowed to cooperate with each other for
information exchange.
Real time Location
Vehicular
Social Network
Request
Response
SNS
LSs
RSU
Figure 1: System architecture
Constraints: In our system, SNS should not be aware of the vehicle loca-
tions. Moreover, LSs are not aware about vehicles’ identity-related information.
Vehicles may submit three types of queries: 1) request for particular friends’
locations, 2) request for nearby friends’ locations, and 3) request for nearby
strangers’ locations.
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2.2. System Workflows
In light of the proposed architecture, five main workflows are defined.
(1) Vehicles must initially register with SNS for location based service. The
registration process requires submitting personal identification information
and make effective proof of authenticity. Moreover, vehicles must also de-
fine their access control policies. SNS maintains a database and processes
vehicles’ personal information. SNS registers all vehicles with the LS, using
pseudo-identities and initial location information.
(2) When arriving at a new place or after a specified time period, vehicles
need to update their information. In this regard, SNS maintains the new
relationships and threshold distances of vehicles, whereas LSs maintain the
new location information.
(3) When a vehicle intends to obtain the location of a friend, they submit a
query for that particular vehicle. If the requester meets the access control
policies of their friends, they can obtain the location information.
(4) When a vehicle intends to obtain nearby friends current location informa-
tion, they submit a query for friends within certain distance. If the vehicle
meets the access control policies of these required friends, they can get the
desired information.
(5) In case of a vehicle requiring nearby stranger’s current location, they submit
a query for strangers within specific distance. If the vehicle meets the access
control policy of strangers (within distance), they can get the locations of
these strangers.
2.3. Threat Model
Out of the listed entities (i.e. vehicles, SNS, & LSs), vehicles are considered
to be dishonest. This means that they may try to access the server they do
not have the permission to access, and find the location of a target vehicle.
Moreover, we assume that SNS and LSs are honest but curious, i.e., they will
follow the scheme formally, but try to obtain as much sensitive information as
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possible. For example, SNS may want to find the location of vehicles, and LSs
may want to obtain sensitive information of vehicles. We suppose that SNS
and LSs may be compromised by an adversary, but not at the same time. This
means that SNS and LSs will not collude with each other. The assumption
is reasonable since it is extremely difficult for an adversary to control the two
servers at the same time.
2.4. Security Goals
Using the defined threat model as guiding principle, the security goals for
location-sharing system are defined as below:
(1) The system should protect vehicles’ location information from SNS and
other unauthorized vehicles. Vehicles’ locations cannot be leaked to friends
or strangers who do not satisfy the predefined access policy.
(2) SNS provides social relationships related service and should not be able to
determine (directly or indirectly) the vehicle locations.
(3) Location servers provide location-based services and should not know vehi-
cles’ social network information and/or identity information.
3. Building Blocks
The main challenge to solve is to implement location-based services while
preserving vehicles’ privacy. In the proposed Privacy Preserving Location Shar-
ing (PPLS) scheme, the vehicle sets threshold distances for different friends
& strangers, and the threshold values may vary with different targets. It is
important to note that, these values may indicate personal emotion tendency
towards different targets, and location service providers can collect this data
to infer such personal information. Therefore, the threshold distance should
be kept private in addition to actual location. To solve this problem, we pro-
pose a secure distance comparison protocol based on Paillier encryption. The
scheme also makes use of RSA encryption, which is elaborated in a nutshell for
comparative understanding.
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3.1. RSA Encryption
RSA encryption is a widely used public-key cryptosystem for secure data
transmission, where a public and private key pair is used for encryption and
decryption. The process is summarized as:
Choose two large prime numbers p and q, compute n = pq. Select random
integer e such that 1 < e < λ(n) and gcd(e, λ(n)) = 1, where λ(n) = (p−1)(q−
1), and gcd is the greatest common divisor. Compute d = e−1(mod(λ(n))).
The public key is (n, e) and the private key is (p, q, d).
Encryption. Assume that M is a message to encrypt. First, turn M(un-padded
plain text) into an integer m(padded plain text) by padding scheme. The ci-
phertext is c = me(modn).
Decryption. Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, m can be recovered by comput-
ing cd = (me)d = m(modn). The plain text message M can be recovered by
reversing the padding scheme.
3.2. Paillier encryption
Paillier public-key cryptosystem is a classical homomorphic semantically se-
cure public-key cryptosystem, and is used in proposed secure distance compar-
ison protocol. This section outlines the basic technique of Paillier public-key
cryptosystem.
Choose two large prime numbers p and q, and compute n = pq. Select
random integer g, g ∈ Z∗n2 , ensure gcd(L(gλ mod n2), n) = 1, where L(x) = x−1n ,
λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1), and lcm is the lowest common multiple. The public key
is (n, g) and the private key is (p, q).
Encryption. Assume that m is a message to be encrypted where 0 ≤ m ≤ n.
Select random r < n, then the ciphertext is c = gm · rn mod n2.
Decryption. Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, where c ∈ Z∗n2 , the plain text
message is m =
L(cλ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
mod n.
Paillier public-key cryptosystem has the following properties.
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Homomorphic addition of plain texts. We can give the value of E(m1 + m2)
through E(m1) and E(m2) without knowing m1 and m2.
D(E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) mod n2) = m1 +m2 mod n
Homomorphic multiplication of plain texts. We can give the value of E(m1m2)
through E(m1) and m2 without knowing m1.
D(E(m1, r1)
m2 mod n2) = m1m2 mod n
3.3. Secure Distance Comparison Protocol
In our system, LSs need to compare the distance between two vehicles with
the corresponding threshold distance to effectively provide services. To preserve
vehicles’ privacy, we propose a secure distance comparison protocol (as shown
in Protocol 1) based on [23] and [24]. Let dthreshold be threshold distance, g
be a generator of a cyclic group M , and dactual be the actual distance. We set
dthreshold and dactual as integers. G is a key generation algorithm. PE is the
Paillier encryption algorithm, and PD is the Paillier decryption algorithm. R is
the space of random coins. S is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm with
S(1k, PK) ⊂ Z, and k is the security parameter.
Protocol 1 Security distance comparison protocol
Input: Threshold distance dthreshold; Actual distance dactual
Output: dthreshold > dactual as TRUE or FALSE
1: SNS generates the key pair (skm, pkm)← G(1k) and a random vale r ← R.
Let c← PEpkm(dthresholdg; r). SNS sends (pkm, c) to LS;
2: LS generates random s← S, r′ ← R, computes
c′ ←(c · PEpkm(−(dactual + i)g; 0))s · PEpkm(0; r′)
=(PEpkm(dthresholdg; r) · PEpkm(−(dactual + i)g; 0))s · PEpkm(0; r′)
=PEpkm(s(dthreshold − (dactual + i))g; rs ◦ r′)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, LS computes c′ and send c′ to SNS;
3: SNS outputs dthreshold > dactual as TRUE, iff PDpkm(c
′) = 0 is found.
Otherwise output FALSE.
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4. Privacy-preserving Location-sharing (PPLS) Scheme
In order to preserve the vehicles’ location and social network privacy, the
scheme utilizes encryption keys generated by different system entities. The
details of each step are given below, and Table 1 lists the notations used in
them.
Symbol Description
ID A vehicle’s social network identifier
PID A vehicle’s pseudo-identifier
SNS Social network server
LSs Location servers
df Threshold distance for a friend
ds Threshold distance for strangers
(pku, sku) A vehicle’s public-private key pair
(pkm, skm) SNS’s public-private key pair
(pks, sks) LS’s public-private key pair
tl The time length for LS to save a record
ts Time stamp
t Vehicles’ location update cycle
(x, y) Location of a vehicle
dis(ui, uj) Distance between ui and uj
PE Paillier encryption algorithm
PD Paillier decryption algorithm
Table 1: Summary of notations
Initialization: Each vehicle has their identifier ID and a public-private
key pair (pku, sku) which can later be updated. Assume SNS and LSs serve a
designated area, and vehicles’ group is represented as U = {u1, u2, . . . , uz}. LS
has a public-private key pair (pks, sks) and all vehicles know LS’s pks.
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Registration: When a vehicle ui with an identifier ID intends to use the
system’s services, they need to register with the SNS first. Registration is in the
form of (ID,Cpks(xi, yi), Cpks(pku), F list, (dfi,1, dfi,2, ..., ds), ts, Sig(ID, ts)), where
Cpks(xi, yi) and Cpks(pku) are ui’s location & public key (respectively) en-
crypted by LS’s public key, Flist is ui’s friend list, dfi,1 is ui’s threshold distance
for friend u1 within which they are willing to share location with u1, ds is the
threshold distance for strangers with which ui is willing to reveal its location to
strangers, ts is a time stamp, and Sig (ID, ts) is a signature generated on ts.
SNS holds a database to save vehicles’ threshold distances.
SNS confirms the request. If the signature is valid, SNS generates a registra-
tion request to LS. The request is in the form of (PID,Cpks (x, y) , Cpks (pku) , tl),
in which PID is ui’s pseudo-identity generated by AES (ID, rt) and rt is a ran-
dom value. tl is the time limit for which the record will be held. LSs can timely
remove the expired data and reduce storage overhead. The value of tl should
be set slightly larger than the update cycle.
Update: For each time period t, vehicles need to update their information.
Similar to the registration content, each vehicle sends a message to SNS in the
form of (ID,Cpks (x, y) , Cpks (pku) , F list, (dfi,1, dfi,2, ..., ds), ts, Sig(ID, ts)), where
Cpks(x, y), Flist and (dfi,1, dfi,2, ..., ds) represent vehicle’s new location en-
crypted by LS’s public key, new friendship, and new threshold distances. With-
out updating pku, the adversary can associate the vehicle’s PIDs by tracing
pku. If the signature is valid, SNS sends (PID,Cpks (x, y) , Cpks (pku) , tl) to
LSs. LSs save related information in their database.
Request for particular friends: If a vehicle ui with an identifier ID
wants to obtain the location(s) of their friend(s) (f1, f2, . . . , fM ), ui submits a
query for friends’ locations in the form of (ID,Cpks(xi, yi),pf ,(f1, f2, . . . , fM ))
to SNS, where pf represents the request type. To handle this request, SNS first
recovers the pseudo-identity PID = (PID1, P ID2, . . . , P IDM ) corresponding to
(f1, f2, . . . , fM ). Then, SNS randomly divides PID intoQ subsets P
1
ID, P
2
ID, . . . , P
Q
ID
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with different sizes, satisfying PID = P
1
ID∪P 2ID∪. . .∪PQID, to prevent the adver-
sary from knowing ui’s friend relationships. For P
j
ID = (PID1, P ID2, . . . , P IDN ),
SNS computes (c1,i, c2,i, . . . , cN,i) = (PEpkm(df1,ig; r1), PEpkm(df2,ig; r2), . . . ,
PEpkm(dfN,ig, rN )), and sends (PID,Cpks (xi, yi),pf ,P
j
ID, (c1,i, c2,i, . . . , cN,i), pkm)
to LSj , where LSj is the jth location server in LSs. After receiving the request,
LSj performs the following steps:
(1) Decrypt Cpks(xi, yi) to get ui’s current location (xi, yi).
(2) Calculate the distances between ui and its friends, and save as (d1, d2, . . . , dN )
= (dis(ui, P ID1), dis(ui, P ID2), . . . , dis(ui, P IDN )).
(3) Choose parameters s and r′. For c1,i, calculate
c′1,i = ((c1,i · PEpkm (− (d1 + p) g; 0))s · PEpkm (0; r′)) .
Let p = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 and send corresponding c′1,i to SNS.
If and only if there exists p which makes PDskm(c
′
1,i) = 0, then d1 < df1,i and ui
satisfies PID1’s access control policy, otherwise ui does not satisfy the policy.
SNS finds all ui’s friends for whom ui satisfies their access control policies. Then
LSj sends those friends’ encrypted locations to SNS. After collecting all results
returned by LSs, SNS sends ui the ciphertexts. ui decrypts the ciphertexts and
gets their requested friend’s location.
Request for friends within specific distance: If a vehicle ui with iden-
tifier ID wants to find friends’ locations within a certain distance, then a query
for friends’ locations is submitted in the form of (ID,Cpks(xi, yi),f ,l) to SNS,
where f indicates the type of request. Similar to request for particular friends’
locations, after grouping friends randomly, SNS sends (PID,Cpks(xi, yi),
f ,P jID, (c1,i, c2,i, . . . , cN,i), pkm, l) to LSj . When receiving the request, LSj per-
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forms the following steps:
(1) Decrypt Cpks(xi, yi) to get ui’s current location (xi, yi).
(2) Calculate the distances between ui and all of their friends, and save as
(d1, d2, . . . , dN ) = (dis(ui, P ID1), dis(ui, P ID2), . . . , dis(ui, P IDN )).
(3) Choose parameters s and r′. For c1,i, calculate
c′1,i = ((c1,i · PEpkm (− (d1 + p) g; 0))s · PEpkm (0; r′)) .
Let p = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 and send corresponding c′1,i to SNS.
If and only if there exists p which makes PDskm(c
′
1,i) = 0, then d1 < df1,i and
ui satisfies PID1’s access control policy. Furthermore, if d1 < l, f1’s location
will be returned. SNS finds all these friends and gets their encrypted locations
from LSj . After collecting the results returned by all LSs, SNS sends the final
response to ui, which decrypts the ciphertext with their own private key sku
and gets the friends’ locations.
Request for strangers within specific distance: If a vehicle ui wants
to find location of stranger(s) who are within l distance from them, then ui
submits a strangers’ locations query (ID,Cpks(xi, yi),s,l) to SNS. Here s is the
request type. Since there are too many unfamiliar vehicles around ui, SNS sends
LSs a query (PID,all,l) first. LSs find all vehicles within l distance away from
ui and feed back the result. Then, SNS eliminates ui’s friends randomly, and
sends (PID,Cpks(xi, yi), s, P
j
ID, (c1,i, c2,i, . . . , cN,i), pkm) to LSj . Assuming a
stranger u2 is within l distance away from ui. u2’s location is (x2, y2) and u2’s
threshold distance for strangers is ds2. If and only if dis(ui, u2) < ds2, LSj
returns u2’s encrypted location to SNS. SNS then sends the final result to ui.
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5. Security Analysis
The security analysis is provided based on the threat model and security
goals. In PPLS, we assume that SNS and LSs. Hence, they do not collude with
each other, and are not compromised by the adversary at the same time.
Access control. PPLS allows vehicles to set different threshold distances for
different targets. Since SNS and LSs are assumed to be honest but curious, they
will follow the protocol formally. That means, only the vehicles who satisfy the
access policy can receive the location information and identity information of
friends/strangers.
Identity privacy. In PPLS, LSs should not have any knowledge of vehicles’
identity-related information. Pseudo-identity is used when vehicles send up-
date messages or queries. Thus, anonymity is achieved. Though threshold dis-
tances may leak identity information (indirectly) of vehicles to the adversary,
homomorphic encryption is used to encrypt the sensitive data. Thus, vehicles’
identity privacy is well preserved.
Location privacy. SNS may collude with dishonest vehicles and attempt to ob-
tain the location information of a particular vehicle illegally. When receiving the
registration/update messages from vehicles or receiving the responses from LSs,
SNS has the chances to access vehicles’ locations. PPLS encrypts vehicles’ lo-
cations using asymmetric encryption, which protects location information from
SNS.
Social network privacy. The privacy of the social network is preserved by two
approaches, which are described as follows.
(1) When a vehicle requests for particular friends or friends/strangers within
specific distances, SNS will divide the friends/strangers into random subsets
and send these sets to different LSs. These subsets have different sizes and
will be sent to LSs randomly. Furthermore, dummy vehicles can be added
into the original set. As a result, each LS can only get part of the friend list
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with dummy vehicles. Since we assume that LS will not collude with each
other, LSs are prevented from knowing vehicles’ social networks.
(2) For each time period t, vehicles need to update their information. During
this phase, SNS assigns each vehicle a new pseudo-identifier, which is differ-
ent from the original one. As a result, after the time period t, for different
queries from the same vehicle, the vehicle’s pseudo-identifier and its friends’
pseudo-identifiers become different. Therefore, it is impossible for LSs to
determine the information of vehicles’ social networks.
6. Experimental Evaluation
The proposed PPLS scheme uses a number of encryption and decryption
steps. To evaluate the real time performance, we have conducted a number of
experiments.
6.1. Implementation
In our system, three cryptography schemes are implemented: digital signa-
ture, asymmetric encryption, and homomorphic encryption. We use RSA [25]
with 1024-bit key size for data encryption, RSA PKCS1-v1-5 for signature, and
Paillier with 1024-bit key size for homomorphic encryption. Our simulation is
implemented on an Intel Xeon E3-1230v3 running at 3.4 GHz with 8 GB 2133
GHz memory. We use Python 3.5.0 to implement the proposed algorithms.
Some PyPI packages are used in our cryptography schemes: pycrypto for signa-
ture, asymmetric encryption and phe for Paillier encryption.
In our experiments, vehicles can use many effective techniques to obtain
locations, such as GPS. We assume that the threshold distance can set as
10, 20, . . . , 100 meters with steps of 10 meters or 100, 200, . . . , 1000 meters with
steps of 100 meters. For friends, vehicles may consider choosing a smaller value
as the threshold distance. For strangers, vehicles may choose a larger value as
the threshold distance.
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6.2. Evaluation
As the RSA signing technology used in the registration and update phases
can be replaced by any other signing algorithms, we do not analyze the regis-
tration and updating phase.
The response time of the system to request for particular friends is related
to the number of friends the vehicle requests. The response time to request for
friends or strangers within specific distance is related to the size of the request
area and the vehicle density within the scope. In essence, this parameter is also
based on number of vehicles requested. Therefore, we observe the time spent for
entire request process and the time spent for secure distance comparison protocol
against different number of requested vehicles. We conduct each experiment 10
times and calculate the average values. The results are shown in Figure 2 and
Figure 3, respectively.
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Figure 2: Entire request process
It can be observed from the results that the time spent on the request pro-
cess increases approximately linearly with the number of vehicles requested,
about 0.75 seconds per 10 individuals. The secure distance comparison protocol
execution time also increases approximately linearly with the number of vehi-
cles requested, about every 10 individuals with 0.7 seconds. The time spent
in implementing the secure distance comparison protocol takes up a large per-
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Figure 3: Secure distance comparison protocol process
centage of the system’s time (in order to generate a response). The protocol
time-consumption is mainly focused on determining the size relationship be-
tween the actual distance and the threshold distance, the traversal encryption
of the actual distance in LS and the response decryption in SNS.
7. Related Works
In recent years, mobile computing has changed the future of communica-
tions and sevices [26, 27], and accordingly promotes the rapid development of
vehicular networks, VSNs have experienced an explosive development. Since a
vehicle’s location is important information used in VSNs, the issue of protect-
ing vehicles’ location privacy has received considerable attention. Until now,
many studies on location privacy protection [28, 29] have been done, such as
location anonymity, information hiding [30] and so on. Location anonymity is
an effective technique for location privacy protection and there are two types
of methods to achieve it: 1) K-anonymity: The fundamental premise is to mix
the real user’s location information into k − 1 other anonymous users’ location
information, which confuses the adversary. This approach is proposed in [31]
by Sweeney in 2002, and then Gruteser et al. used it for location privacy pro-
tection in [32]. Kido et al. extended K-anonymity, and introduced the concept
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of virtual location [33]. 2) Location encryption: The main idea of Location
encryption is to encrypt the users’ location information with some encryption
algorithms, such as the algorithm proposed by Khoshgozaran et al. [34] using
Hilbert curves to encrypt the original location.
By combing the aforementioned methods, a series of research works have
been proposed. In 2007, SmokeScreen [35] proposed a scheme to protect users’
location privacy and provide location-sharing services for users. Subsequently,
Wei et al. proposed MobiShare [14], which supports users sharing location
information flexibly. In MobiShare, social network server and location server
store users’ profiles and location information separately. Hence, neither of the
two severs know the complete information of the users. However, this scheme
cannot protect users’ social network topologies. Later, based on MobiShare,
several mechanisms were proposed, such as N-MobiShare [15, 16], MobiShare+
[17], and B-MobiShare [15]. In N-MobiShare, cellular tower was not treated
as a core component of the system. Social network server took cellular tower’s
task and forwarded users’ requests to location server. N-MobiShare used broad-
cast encryption to share off-line keys to users’ friends. Although N-Mobishare
has a simpler structure than MobiShare, it did not solve the problem which
MobiShare suffered. That is, the location server can still get users’ social net-
work topologies in the query phase. Inspired by Wei et al.’s solution, Li et al.
found that in MobiShare the pseudo-identity of the querying user can be known
by LSs in the friend’s query. Hence, they proposed an improved mechanism
named MobiShare+ [17]. Besides dummy locations and identities, this mech-
anism employed dummy queries. It applied a private set intersection protocol
to prevent individual information leaked between the social network sever and
the location server. MobiShare+ overcomes the weakpoints of MobiShare and
N-MobiShare. However, it incurred excessively long processing time. To solve
this problem and improve the transmission efficiency, Shen et al. proposed B-
MobiShare [15]. Bloom Filter was used in this scheme to replace the private set
intersection protocol in MobiShare+ and the time cost was reduced. However,
B-MobiShare was less efficient than expected, the time cost was still high. In
18
2017, Li et al. proposed a system with enhanced privacy [19], using multiple
location servers to prevent insider attack launched by the service providers.
However, all the above mechanisms do not treat the threshold distance as
sensitive data, and work with a single threshold distance for users to set for all
of their friends, which is unrealistic in real social networks.
8. Conclusion
Privacy preservation of location sharing in VSNs is an important issue. In
this article we propose PPLS, which protects vehicles’ location privacy from
SNS and preserves vehicles’ social network privacy from LSs. The scheme allows
vehicles to set different threshold distances for different friends, and to enjoy a
more flexible access control policy. In order to implement this access control
policy, a secure distance comparing protocol is presented. To permit vehicles
sharing locations with friends, new queries are designed for particular friends.
The security analysis shows that PPLS is secure under a comprehensive security
model. Moreover, the experimental evaluation demonstrates the efficiency of
PPLS.
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